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Abstract 
This paper considers the possibility that the prices bid by asset reconstruction companies in 
India under a security receipt mechanism may not reflect the ultimate recoverable value of 
nonperforming loans. The paper establishes, using a model and simulations, that the price bid 
by asset reconstruction companies will reveal their own rational interest and can significantly 
exceed the recoverable value. The conclusions arrived in this paper raise concerns regarding 
the use of bids as an indicator of fair value on bank’s financial statements. The paper offers 
certain recommendations to mitigate the impact of an erroneous auction design.   
 
 
 
  
I. Introduction 
The nonperforming loans (“NPLs) on the balance sheet of Indian banks have increased 
significantly in the last few years, primarily owing to an intervention by Reserve Bank of 
India (“RBI”) forcing banks to recognise the problem rather than relying upon unviable 
restructuring and other mechanisms to delay the recognition (Pandey, 2016). Definition of an 
NPL varies across countries and there is no single definition per se to accommodate country-
specific differences. International Monetary Fund (2005) defines a loan as nonperforming 
“when payments of interest and/or principal are past due by 90 days or more, or interest 
payments equal to 90 days or more have been capitalized, refinanced, or delayed by 
agreement, or payments are less than 90 days overdue, but there are other good reasons —
such as a debtor filing for bankruptcy—to doubt that payments will be made in full”. RBI 
(2015) follows a definition similar to International Monetary Fund and requires banks to 
classify an asset as nonperforming if a loan’s principal or interest payment remains overdue 
for a period of 90 daysi. The use of Asset Management Companies (“AMCs”), organizations 
established with the specific purpose of either disposing NPLs transferred from banks or 
restructuring such NPLs, is one of the standard approaches to the resolution of banking crisis 
(Mako, 2001; Haley, 2000; Campbel, 2007; Classens et al, 1999; Caprio and Klingebiel, 
1999; Kane, 1989 and 1999; Woo, 2000). Bank of International Settlement (2002) defines 
AMCs as “special purpose company set up by a government, a bank, or by private investors 
to acquire loans and other assets, a majority of which are impaired, for subsequent 
management (including restructuring) and in many cases, sale to investors.” Hryckiewicz 
(2014) cites intervention of AMCs in 62 instances in 25 countries. AMCs help stressed banks 
by addressing their stock problems (quantity of NPLs on balance sheets) and thereby 
improving regulatory capital and solvency outlook. In situations where AMCs relieve banks 
from NPL burden, banks are in a position to focus on improving flow measures (profitability, 
credit disbursement amongst others) for continued viability (Klingebiel, 2000; Dziobek and 
Pazarbasioglu ,1997). There also exists a possibility of a principal-agent conflict and 
misalignment of incentives between Banks and AMCs in certain situations requiring careful 
monitoring and timely intervention (Kane, 1990; Klingebiel, 2000; Ingves et al, 2004; Terada 
–Hagivara and Pasadilla, 2004; Woo, 2000).   Indian banks have also relied on AMCs (or 
ARCs as they are referred in Indiaii) to tackle growing NPL problem (Narang and Kaveri, 
2016).  Banks in India are allowed to sell NPLs to ARCs using a ‘security receipt 
mechanism’ where ARCs pay a small, upfront payment and the remainder amount is paid in 
form of security receipts (“SRs”). The paper demonstrates, using a model and a simulation, 
that the price bid by ARCs for NPLs under a security receipt mechanism may or may not 
reflect the ultimate recoverable value from the disposition of such NPLs. The paper also 
establishes that the price bid by ARCs will reveal their own rational interest and may not be 
aligned with the Bank’s recoverable value. Importantly, this paper illustrates multiple 
scenarios where bids made by ARCs in a rational setting can significantly exceed the 
recoverable loan value. This paper determines that the ARC’s entry value bears a limited 
relationship to seller’s exit value in many instances and therefore ARC bid cannot construe 
fair value of NPLs in isolation. The conclusions arrived in this paper raise concerns regarding 
the real financial strength and potential losses for Indian banks that have frequently used the 
sale of NPLs to ARCs to establish fair value. They also offer guidance to banks and 
regulators towards an effective auction mechanism design that can mitigate conflicts and 
align incentives between banks and AMCs. Rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 explains the security receipt mechanism used by banks in NPL sales and introduces 
theoretical underpinnings of a ‘first price, sealed bid, contingent payment’ auction technique 
that bears similarities to security receipt mechanism. Section 3 reviews existing literature 
regarding objectives of ARCs, possible conflicts of interest between banks and ARCs, and 
use of fair market value (FMV) approach in financial statements. In section 4, using a 
combination of model and simulation, I highlight the fallacy that auction of NPLs by Indian 
banks is an effective risk transfer mechanism that maximises seller utility and establishes fair 
market value of NPLs. Section 5 concludes this paper with a discussion of results and their 
implications for Indian banking economy. 
 
II. Security Receipt Mechanism 
Banks in India routinely sell NPLs to a trust floated by ARCs using a sealed bid, first price 
auction and purchase Pass Through Certificates (referred as Security Receipts (SRs)) 
underlying such trust. Figure 1 explains the transaction structure for an NPL sale under a 
security receipt mechanism.  
 
Figure 1: Transaction Structure for a typical Security Receipt Mechanism Auction 
 
The proportion of SRs purchased by banks has been as high as 95 percentage of sale value in 
the past.  RBI guidelines as of date restrict bank’s maximum participation to 85 percentage of 
sale value and 15 percentage of SRs have to be mandatorily retained by ARC. These SRs are 
classified as non-statutory liquidity ratio investments on the books of subscribing banks. The 
recovery for Banks on the SRs is entirely contingent upon the recovery made by ARC on the 
underlying NPLs resulting in a possibility that bank may have an impairment on its 
investment in SRs at a later date. In effect, the bank retains up to 95% of the risk on assets 
sold to ARCs and only de minimis risk is effectively transferred. Accounting policies for 
Indian banks regarding the sale of NPLs combined with loss aversion tendency  may be 
motivations for this ineffectual risk transfer (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Levy, 1992). 
 
Auctions represent an antithesis of perfect competition – competition is existent only on the 
one side of the marketplace. Buyers (or sellers in a procurement auction) compete for goods 
(or service contracts) available in a limited quantity that are usually sold by a monopolistic or 
a monopsonistic party on the other side. There exist multiple forms of auctions; almost all of 
these auctions are variations of the rule applied to two key types of auction – First Price 
Sealed Bid Auction and Second Price Sealed Auction. In a First Price Sealed Bid Auction 
(which is strategically equivalent to a Dutch Auctioniii), buyers submit sealed bids and the 
bidder with the highest bid is awarded the item at his bid value (Vickrey, 1961). In a Second 
Price Sealed Bid Auction (which is strategically equivalent to an English Auctioniv), buyers 
submit sealed bids and the bidder with the highest bid is awarded the item at the second 
highest bid value. The auction mechanism used by Indian banks is a first price, sealed bid 
auction with two payment streams – Payment 1 with certainty at the time of winning the bid 
(which is equivalent to the ARC’s participation interest) and Payment 2 in a form of debt 
security whose redemption is contingent upon the amount of overall recovery. Auctions with 
contingent payments were first analysed by Hansen (1985) where he showed that the second 
price auctions with contingent payment generate higher bid as compared to the second price 
cash auctions. Riley (1988) showed that the results of Hansen hold valid for the first price 
auctions. DeMarzo et al (2005) analysed various forms of securities constituting contingent 
payment and held that higher utility of contingent payment auction mechanism is 
generalizable across a class of securities and auction types. Additional literature on non-cash 
auctions exists in the field of bankruptcy and corporate reorganisation (Aghion et al, 1992) 
and privatisation (Bolton and Roland, 1992).  
 
Auctions with contingent payments create a valuation problem as a seller is forced to select 
the highest bid but the value of the bid itself in not known fully to the seller due to an 
attached contingency. For example, in an NPL sale where the seller receives a debt security 
of the underlying trust as a part of total payment, the value of such debt security is unknown 
until the debt is completely resolved either by restructuring or by disposition.  Auctions with 
contingent payments, therefore, involve a signalling aspect where the bidder wants the seller 
to believe that he has the highest bid (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2000). While this 
signalling phenomenon does increase the bid amount, it may not increase the seller’s 
expected revenue if contingencies evolve along an unfavourable dimension. Further, in 
situations where upfront investment by the bidder is low and the bidder is compensated for 
his efforts by Seller, auctions designed with contingent payment create misaligned objectives. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2000) demonstrate this outcome in corporate bankruptcy 
situations where bankruptcy costs are small and the contingent bid is in the form of debt 
security. In these cases, the bids will be extremely high rendering ex post bankruptcy a virtual 
certainty and the seller may eventually end up repossessing the assets sold. Samuelson (1987) 
similarly shows the possibility of high bids that appropriate almost the entire surplus for the 
seller’s benefit and consequently may result in an adverse selection and a principal-agent 
problem. This outcome has also been empirically observed in the case of spectrum sale in the 
United States (Cramton, 1997). The possibility of high bids exceeding true intrinsic value is 
evaluated in the current setting, the case of NPL auctions by Indian banks to ARCs, as the 
first enquiry in this paper.    
 
III. Existing Literature on objectives of AMCs, conflicts and fair market value 
AMCs help stressed banks by addressing their stock problems (quantity of NPLs on balance 
sheet) and thereby improving regulatory capital and solvency outlook. In situations where 
AMCs relieve banks from NPL burden, banks are in a position to focus on improving flow 
measures (profitability, credit disbursement amongst others) for continued viability 
(Klingebiel, 2000; Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu ,1997). Woo (2000) identified facilitation of 
financial restructuring, high rate of recovery, speedy resolution and normalisation of capital 
markets as the objectives of a sound AMC. Osuji (2012) averred that effectiveness of AMCs 
is determined by issues of relief, restructuring, recovery, resuscitation, rehabilitation, 
responsibility, restitution and reoccurrence (RE-7 framework). Van-Suntum and Ilgman 
(2013) have identified three factors for an effective AMC solution– (a) transparent removal 
of toxic assets, (b) minimum costs to the public, and (c) curtailing moral hazard. Dziobek and 
Pazarbasioglu (1997) used six factors that capture the scale of financial intermediation, the 
efficiency of financial intermediation and the riskiness of ex post banking system to 
understand the impact of the intervention on bank’s financial intermediation capacity. 
Klingebiel (2000) used success in sale or restructuring, crisis recurrence, resumption of real 
credit to private sector and growth of aggregate credit in real terms to evaluate the impact of 
AMC intervention. Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) used amount of asset purchase and recovery 
percentage to evaluate the effectiveness of AMCs in Japan.  
 
Concerns that banks can use private AMCs for perverse reasons and not for the above 
mentioned objectives have been expressed in the literature. Klingebiel (2000)  notes  that 
“They [private AMCs] can be used for window-dressing if assets are transferred at book 
value or above market value, i. e. not all losses are not taken at the bank level but some are 
effectively transferred to another entity.”   Klingebiel (2000) also notes that large privately 
held centralised AMCs are rare – but in India, all AMCs as of date are private AMCs.  
Tanaka and Hoggarth (2006) suggest that in situations where there is no regulatory 
intervention, the management may take a gamble on the small chance that these loans may be 
recoverable. This practice is commonly known as a ‘gamble for resurrection’ (Baldursson 
and Portes, 2013; Campbell, 2007). Ingves at al (2004) highlight the inherent conflict of 
interest between AMC’s objectives of rapid resolution and its continued existence. 
Appropriate regulatory framework, high quality disclosures, and accounting regulations with 
strong monitoring and enforcement by the regulator, auditor, analysts and investors is a 
precondition before asset transfer to a private AMC or a spinoff of NPLs to a separately 
capitalised entity. To avoid an accounting chicanery, the assets should be transferred at their 
intrinsic economic value. But the valuation of NPLs is a difficult exercise with multiple 
uncertainties (Ingves and Lind, 1997). Since banks have an informational advantage over any 
ARC due to proximity with borrower affairs, banks may only transfer assets where the price 
agreed is above the intrinsic economic value (Van-Suntum and Ilgmann, 2013). In addition, it 
is possible that accounting standards regarding provisioning requirement inform bank 
behaviour. In such instances, banks will only transfer NPLs that attract a bid higher than the 
Net Book Value (“NBV”). A significant ownership interest of ARC in the transferred NPL 
will usually lead to situations where bids made by ARCs reflect the intrinsic economic value 
of NPL. The principal-agent conflict is completely eliminated when ARCs participation 
interest is hundred per cent (Samuelson, 1987). But in instances where ARC participation is 
not enough, and ARCs have an additional income stream besides participation in recovery 
proceeds, it is possible that a rational bid by ARC is in excess of true economic value. The 
proposition that ARC bids can materially diverge from the true intrinsic value of NPLs, 
which is supported by both auction theory and AMC literature, constitutes the first enquiry in 
this research paper.  
 
It is assumed by standard settersv that the intrinsic economic value of an asset is captured 
adequately by the use of a fair-value accounting approach.  The fair-value accounting 
approach reports assets and liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value on every reporting 
period and recognises the changes in fair value as gains and losses in the income statementvi 
(Laux and Leuz, 2010). Financial Accounting Standard Bureau (2006) has published detailed 
guidelines for fair value accounting (FASB-157) and defines that “(f)air value is the price that 
would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction 
between market participants at the measurement date.” Indian Accounting Standard (AS 113) 
follows FASB definition verbatim. There is recognition by standard setters that market prices 
may not be available for various assets due to infrequent trading. AS 113 explicitly 
recognises this issue in its preamble by noting that “(w)hen a price for an identical asset or 
liability is not observable, an entity measures fair value using another valuation technique 
that maximises the use of relevant observable inputs and minimises the use of unobservable 
inputs.” It is also possible that market prices deviate from intrinsic values and therefore do 
not reflect an orderly transaction due to illiquidity or limits to arbitrage that ensure trading 
prices being equal to the intrinsic value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).  In practice, the 
estimation of fair value typically uses a hierarchical approach. Market prices are considered 
as the best estimate of fair value if market conditions satisfy the quality criterion of fair value 
definition (Hitz, 2007). In situations where market prices do not have requisite quality or are 
unavailable, market prices of comparable instruments with a similar cash-flow are 
considered. As a last resort, prices are marked to an internally developed or publicly available 
model. In the case of NPLs sold by Indian banks to ARCs, auction market is considered as an 
active market with necessary quality and the price paid for NPL by ARC winning the auction 
is considered as fair value. Banks adopt following accounting policy prescribed by RBI for 
NPLs sold to ARCs. 
1. Once a bank sells its NPL to ARC, the NPL is removed from its books. 
2. If the sale to ARC is at a price below the NBV (i.e., book value less provisions 
held), the shortfall is debited to the profit and loss account of that year. However, 
for assets sold on or after February 26, 2014, and up to March 31 2016, banks can 
spread such shortfall over a period of two years. For assets sold on or after 31st 
March, 2016 and up to March 31, 2017, banks can spread any shortfall over a 
period of four quarters. Banks can also use countercyclical / floating provisions 
for meeting any shortfall on the sale of NPLs.  
3. Banks can reverse the excess provision on sale of NPLs, if the sale value is for a 
value higher than the carrying value, in the year the amounts are received. 
However, banks can reverse excess provision arising out of the sale of NPLs only 
when the cash received (by way of initial consideration and / or redemption of 
SRs) is higher than the NBV of the NPL.   
4. When banks invest in the security receipts/ pass-through certificates issued by 
ARCs in respect of the NPLs sold by them, the sale shall be recognised in books 
of the banks at the lower of: 
a. the redemption value of the SRs, and 
b. the NBV of the NPL. 
 
There is a debate in the extant literature regarding the use of fair value and its effects.  The 
arguments against the use of fair value include dangers from marking to model rather than 
marking to market, concerns about excess earnings volatility, and feedback effects that could 
harm business climate and perpetuate systemic risk of higher order (Penman, 2007). There is 
no specific literature available on the appropriateness of fair value derived by auction bids of 
private AMCs while transferring bank NPLs.  Literature does exist to point that assets are 
transferred in some cases to public AMCs at a price higher that fair value to aid bank 
recapitalization (Fung et al, 2004). The scarcity of literature is possible due to the fact that 
private AMCs are rare and a determination of transfer price to a public AMC from 
government owned banks is often an accounting exercise with limited economic implications. 
However, the literature on the definition of fair value and its utility relies heavily on the 
concept of exit value under a perfect exchange – i.e. the seller’s exit value is equivalent to 
buyer’s entry value (Barth and Landsman, 1995). Our second enquiry in this paper will be to 
evaluate whether this proposition holds true for NPLs sold under security receipt mechanism.  
 
IV. Model  and Simulations 
A. Model 
Let us assume that a Bank has extended a loan with the following details and the loan has 
turned non-performing prior to sale to ARC. 
Loan Unpaid Principal Balance = L;  
Market Value of underlying collateral at the time of resolution = A;  
Value at which loan is bid by ARC = Y;   
Recovery Percentagevii = Z; 
Probability of effecting collateral sale = P;   
Probability of any other resolutions = Nil; 
Percentage of Securities Receipt retained by ARCs (Participation Rate) = B;   
Discount Rate for ARC =r; and 
Annual Management Fee paid as a fixed amount to ARC = M 
Let us also assume that all recoveries happen in one single instance at time ‘t’ expressed in 
years; annual management fee due to ARC is paid at the time of resolution; there are zero 
‘out of pocket’ recovery expenses incurred by the ARC; ARCs have other avenues of 
investment that offer a yield at least equal to ‘r’; ARCs do not have liquidity constraints; and 
that Z*A ≤L 
 
Lemma 1: The price bid by ARCs for NPLs under security mechanism route is inversely 
proportional to the ARCs participation interest. 
NPV of ARC investment (“NPVa”) can then be written as per equation below: 
NPVa = BPZAe-rt  + tMe-rt  -BY       (1) 
An ARC will bid for assets in all instances where NPVa ≥0. Therefore, bid by ARC  in 
the auctionviii will be driven by equation (2) below: 
NPVa = BPZAe-rt  + tMe-rt  -BY =0       (2) 
Above equation can be simplified as equation (3) below: 
Y = PZAe-rt + tMe-rt  /B        (3) 
Equation (3) above leads to two important conclusions regarding (i) the effect of minimum 
participation mandated for ARC on price bid by ARC and (ii) the possibility of irrational 
bidding by ARC. As the percentage of securities receipt retained by ARCs (‘B’) decreases, 
the price paid by ARC for the loan acquired under SR route (‘Y’) increases without a change 
in any other loan variable such as the recovery rate or the probability of disposition. In 
situations where B is equal to zero or close to zero (ARC has no or minimum stake in the 
loan sold by the bank), Y reaches either infinity or an extremely high value. 
 
Corollary 1: The price bid by ARC for NPLs sold under security mechanism route is not 
always linked to the true intrinsic value of NPL. 
Term ‘PZA’ in equation (3) represents the true intrinsic value of the NPL.  And for 
P=1 and     ZA =L, i.e. certainty that the underlying collateral can be disposed 
strictly at value equal to the unpaid principal balance of the loan, it can be shown 
that: 
Y is greater than or equal to the true intrinsic value in all instances where                 
tM /(B *(ert -1)) > L.           (4) 
The result that the. price paid for a non performing loan can be higher than the true intrinsic 
value of the loan itself if above condition is met, though seemingly counterintuitive has an 
easy explanation. An ARC with limited participation interest will find it rational to bid more 
than the recovery value of loan since it is able to compensate for the loss on its investment in 
security receipts from its earnings through management fee. This result also shows that the 
value bid by ARCs for acquiring an NPL under SR route will be dominated by ARC’s 
economic rationale and not by the potential recovery value of the loan, eventually resulting in 
a conflict of interest and misaligned incentives.   
 
Lemma 2: The price bid by ARC for NPLs sold under security mechanism route may not be 
equal to the price that the selling bank requires to ultimately recover the true intrinsic value. 
The bid price Yb that a bank should expect from ARCix when an NPL is sold under the 
security receipt mechanism to at least recover the true intrinsic value is derived as follows.  
NPV of selling bank (“NPVb”) can then be written as equation (5) below 
NPVb= (1-B)*PZAe-rt  + BYb – tMe-rt  -PZAx       (5) 
For this NPVb to exceed zero, (1-B)*PZAe-rt  + BYb should be greater than tMe-rt  + 
PZA.  
At equilibrium, loan price Yb should be such that NPVb is not negative and at least 
equal to zero. 
Or PZA= (1-B)*PZAe-rt  + B Yb – tMe-rt  ,  which can be expressed as 
Yb  = PZA/B + tMe-rt /B  + PZA –PZA  - (1-B)*PZAe-rt /B 
But  we know from (3) earlier that Y = tMe-rt /B  + PZA, or  
Yb  = PZA *(1-B)/B + Y – PZAe-rt *(1-B)/B , or 
Yb – Y = PZA *(1-B)/B *(1 – e-rt)       (6) 
It can be shown that for all instances where t>0 and r>0, if there are real assets 
securing the loan with some recovery potential, Yb is greater than Y.  
B. Simulations 
This subsection builds upon the findings from the model and illustrates various scenarios 
using simulations where above result - that the price bid by ARC can be higher than the 
intrinsic true value of the loan - holds true. Equations (3) and (6) were analysed using a range 
of values for the six input variables namely probability of disposition (P), recovery rate (Z), 
time to resolution (t), annual management fee (M), discount rate demanded by ARC (r) and 
participation rate of ARC (B). 18,750 scenarios were simulated using a unique combination 
of above variables and the simulation design is enclosed as table 1. 
Table 1: Simulation design 
 
The key results from above scenario analysis are as follows: 
1. ARCs will make a bid exceeding the true intrinsic value in 13,093 scenarios or in 
almost 70 per cent of cases. 
2. ARCs, on an average, will bid twice the intrinsic value with the median value of bids 
at 1.33 and the mode at 1.92. 
Collateral 
Value Probability Recovery Percentage Year Fee Discount Rate
Participation 
Interest
A P Z T M R B
Low 100 20% 20% 1 1 10% 5%
High 100 100% 100% 6 3 30% 25%
Step 0 20% 20% 1 0.5 5% 5%
Count of steps 0 5 5 6 5 5 5
Split NA 1 5 25 150 750 3750
3. The highest bid made by ARC is expected to be as high as 50 times the true intrinsic 
value of the loan. The summary statistics for estimated bids of ARC are attached as 
table 2. 
Table 2: Summary statistics for possible bids by ARC (Y) 
 
4. An evidence of overbidding by ARCs was found at all participation interest values 
(starting at 5% and ending at 25%) considered in the scenario analysis. The 
frequency of overbidding decreased with an increase in the Participation Interest in 
line with results of equation (4). Instances of overbidding stratified by participation 
interest are summarised in table 3. 
Table 3: Participation Interest and Bid Value 
 
We will select one extreme scenario and numerically discuss the rationality behind ARC bids 
in the excess of intrinsic value. In this scenario, the collateral value is 100, the probability of 
resolution is 20 per cent, the recovery rate is 20%, time till resolution is 6 years, annual 
management fee is 3, the discount rate is 10% and the participation interest is 5%. For these 
values of variables, ARC makes a bid (Y) of 200 as per the model and bank expects a bid 
Mean 2.07
Standard Error 0.02
Median 1.33
Mode 1.92
Standard Deviation 2.49
Sample Variance 6.20
Kurtosis 53.15
Skewness 5.64
Range 49.74
Count 18750.00
Largest(1) 49.94
Smallest(1) 0.20
Participation Interest Bid > Intrensic Value
5% 3536
10% 3013
15% 2529
20% 2157
25% 1858
(Yb) of 236 as per the model. It is critical to reemphasize that the intrinsic value of the asset is 
4 (100*0.2*0.2) and the bid made by ARC is 200 or almost 50 times the intrinsic value. ARC 
makes a 5% upfront investment and therefore proposes to invest 10. ARC recognises that its 
recovery on investment will be only 0.2 (4*0.5) but is able to make this bid as it expects 
compensation of 18 (6*3) as the management fee. The receipt of 0.2 and 18, when adjusted 
for the time value at 10% discount rate and 6 years, results in time adjusted revenue of 10 for 
the ARC compensating it for the upfront investment. 
 
If the selling bank is aware of ex post recovery rate and the probability of resolution 
assumptions of ARC, it should expect an even higher price of 236 to ultimately receive the 
true intrinsic value of 4.  These results clearly illustrate the fallacy of relying upon ARC bid 
as the true intrinsic value of NPL. We will now analyse the impact of using ARC bid as an 
indicator of fair value by the selling bank. Let us assume that bank has extended a loan of 80 
against the above collateral value of 100. We will consider two scenarios, one where the bank 
has made limited provisioning and other where the bank has made full provisioning. 
Scenario 1:  We will assume in this scenario that the bank has provisioned only 15% towards 
this NPL (NBV = 68). If ARC bids 200 for this NPL and makes an upfront investment of 10, 
bank will transfer the asset from its books at 68. The bank is able to defer the additional 
losses of 64 (68-4) to a later date (a date when either NAV of SR declines or SRs have to be 
compulsorily redeemed which is typically 6 years from the date of sale). The financial assets 
of the bank in this case are overstated by 64. 
 Scenario 2:  We will assume in this scenario that the bank has already provisioned 
completely towards the NPL (NBV = 4). If ARC bids 200 for this NPL and makes an upfront 
investment of 10, the bank will transfer the asset from its books at 4. The bank is thus able to 
book a profit of 6 on the day of sale. The income of the bank in this case is overstated by 6 in 
the reporting period. 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
The paper demonstrates that the price bid by ARCs for NPLs under a security receipt 
mechanism may or may not reflect the ultimate recoverable value from the disposition of 
such acquired NPLs. We have established that the price bid by ARCs will reveal their own 
rational interest and may not be aligned with the Bank’s ultimate realisable value. We have 
illustrated multiple situations   where ARCs are economically incentivised to make bids that 
far exceed the fair value of NPLs. In these situations, earnings for ARCs are generated at the 
expense of public sector banks initially and taxpayers ultimately.  This shortcoming in the 
auction mechanism design needs to be addressed by the banks and regulators. Some of the 
solutions to this avail will include (a) a floating ARC participation interest to be included as a 
core bid parameter along with the loan value, (b) mandating that the payment of management 
fee to ARC will be contingent upon achieving certain minimum recovery rate and (c) 
instituting punitive measures including revocation of license in case recovery on assets fall 
continuously below a certain threshold for an ARC.  
 
This paper also determines that due to buyer’s limited participation in the purchased assets 
and the contingent nature of bid payments, buyer’s value bears a limited relationship to 
seller’s exit value in certain instances. In such situations, use of fair value accounting on 
selling bank’s financial statements can lead to a misrepresentation and an overstatement of 
asset values. Banks (along with regulators, standard setters and auditors) cannot rely solely 
upon ARC bids to establish fair value and need to corroborate bid values with their internal 
models to avoid misrepresentation on financial statements. 
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i
 A detailed definition of NPL as per RBI is available in RBI master circular referenced in this paper. 
ii
 Acronyms ͚AMC͛ and ͚ARC͛ have been used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
iii
 An auction type where the auctioneer starts with a high asking price that is reduced incrementally until a 
bidder is willing to accept the auctioneer's price. 
iv
 A typical, open-outcry, ascending auction. 
v
 Refers to various accounting regulatory bodies across the world that form the International Forum of 
Accounting Standard Setters. 
vi
 A direct contrast to fair value approach is an historical accounting approach where assets are marked to the 
historical purchase value. 
vii
 Recovery Percentage = Proceeds from Collateral Disposition / Market Value of collateral at the time of 
resolution 
viii
 Auction mechanism usually adopted by Banks selling assets to ARCs. 
ix
 Under assumption that ex post probability of resolution and recovery rate of Arc is known to the bank. 
x
 Assuming that probability of recovery is neither impacted positively nor negatively by the intervention of 
ARC. 
